Proceedings of the 51st Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2018

Data Perspective in Digital Platforms:
Three Tales of Genetic Platforms
Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa
McCombs School of Business,
University of Texas at Austin, USA
sirkka.jarvenpaa@mccombs.utexas.edu

Abstract
Digital platforms play a critical facilitating role in
the “changing models of biomedical research” and
clinical care. Such platforms integrate disparate data
sources and formats—including genetic, health,
genealogical, and increasingly lifestyle data—into
more accessible, searchable, and computationally
efficient structures for basic scientific research, as well
as for clinical care. Genetic platforms involve
unprecedented data management challenges because
of their scale and multidimensionality. Still, little
research has been conducted on genetic platforms.
Leveraging secondary data on three interlinked
genetic platforms, we pursue a data perspective on
platform evolution and entrepreneurial strategies. We
contribute to the discussion on the design and
evolution of digital platforms that considers
responsible data use.

1. Introduction
"Genomics is at the crossroads where data and
biology meet."
Li Ge, chairman of WuXiNextCODE, 2017.
During the twentieth century, digital technologies
fundamentally disrupted businesses and social
communities. During the twenty-first century, biology
promises to alter life, death, and their pathways.
Genetics opens doors for fundamental changes in the
ways we understand diseases and their mechanisms.
But these revolutions in biology at large, and in
genetics in particular, are closely intertwined with
disruptions in digital technologies.
Genetic platforms are enabled by digital
technologies. In genetics, data represent the blood line
that makes possible new research discoveries and that
enable new treatment possibilities and care solutions in
clinical practice. Genetic platforms facilitate the
collection, storage, and analysis of large-scale genetic
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data with phenotypical and behavioral data. Since the
mapping of the human genome project completed in
2003, data centric models have begun emerging that
offer a compelling complement to basic scientific
biomedical research and to the classic drug
development models, as well as to care delivery [7].
Genome-wide association studies require access to
large-scale genetic databases that allow the comparison
of people who have a particular disease with those who
do not have the disease. Personalized precision care
requires the ability to integrate genetic data with
detailed phenotypical data from medical records and
family history. And consumer personal genetics
companies like 23andMe are giving individuals direct
access to their own genetic data, marketed as a form of
entertainment about family history, which can be
informative about an individual’s health risks [27, 29].
Annas and Elias [2] predict that in a few years, “a
majority of health plans will make it easy for their
members to have their entire genomes sequenced and
linked to their electronic health records and will
provide software to help people interrogate their own
genomes, with or without the help of their physicians
or a genetic counselor supplied by the health plan.”
Although genetic platforms populate daily news
headlines, they have attracted little interest apart from
the genetic data controversies and disputes related to
medical, ethical, legal, security, and privacy concerns
[3, 4, 30]. The concerns with data include informed
consent, information privacy, the right to withdraw
consent, the obligation to give feedback to study
participants, benefit sharing arrangements, secondary
uses of genetic data, and possible access to data by
governments, public safety authorities, and insurance
companies [5,10]. Although these issues are clearly
important, the platforms themselves have drawn little
interest. Even when the objective has been to
commercialize genetic data, the focus has been on the
loss of trust, restrictions on researcher and public
access, and conflicts of public and private interests.
The role of digital platforms has not been explored.
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Meanwhile, the information systems and
technology management literature has focused on
digital platforms but not on genetic platforms and not
on data more broadly speaking [13, 32]. Development
toolkits that give access to and analyze data streams are
discussed in terms of their applications and the size of
the platform’s potential market. But the toolkits and
applications, rather than the data, are in the limelight.
In health information technology literature, digital
platforms and infrastructures have been examined in
terms of coordinating access to care, facilitating
knowledge transfer, and improving operational
efficiencies [23]. What has been missing is the role of
digital platforms in cultivating new scientific
discoveries and treatment knowledge.
Admittedly, well-funded “triple-helix” partnerships
involving government entities, corporations, and
universities have tried to build genetic databanks for
the scientific community, but some of these efforts
have faltered in the face of restrictive national
regulations and relentless controversies [30].
Framingham Genetic Medicine (FGM) provides
one case in point [19, 24, 26, 31]. FGM was a forprofit venture with 20% ownership by Boston
University. FGM aimed to digitize data from the
Framingham heart study, conducted by Boston
University under contract from the National Heart,
Lung, and Blood Institute. Starting in 1948, the study
gathered panel data on more than 5,000 residents of
Framingham, MA. Boston University continued the
study after the NIH contract expired; an additional
5,000 Framingham residents were recruited. Through
the years, the study yielded valuable research results
and a vast quantity of potentially valuable but largely
manual data about the subjects’ health and lifestyles.
The FGM venture was formed in 2000 to digitize the
data. FGM planned to conduct genetic “linkage
studies” “similar to those being done by Gemini
Genomics (Cambridge, UK) and deCODE Genetics
(Reykjavik, Iceland)…” [16] and to fund the entire
effort by providing data access to pharmaceutical firms
for drug discovery research. FGM failed because NIH
insisted that genetic data collected using public funds
had to remain open for use by other researchers--a
condition that would preclude a period of privileged
access for fee-paying drug companies. Concerns about
privacy were also raised, although the dispute about
exclusive access to data is what ultimately resulted in
the collapse of the effort.
Other failed efforts include the UmanGenomics in
Sweden. The effort involved a grant of exclusive
commercial rights (but not exclusive access) to an
existing, publicly owned, research biobank; and
consent for such use and access was secured from the
participating individuals. New consent had to be

secured for individual projects that exceeded the scope
of the existing consent. Despite being heralded as a
model of ethical conduct, fights over intellectual
property rights brought the venture down [30].
Other more recent partnerships are following an
open science and drug discovery approach (including
genetic analysis), such as the effort at the Montreal
Neurological Institute at McGill University. Here,
researchers maintain the intellectual property rights to
their research outputs [28].1
Publicly funded efforts increasingly are
complemented by entrepreneurial firms with bold
initiatives to build genetic platforms. Although left
unexamined, these efforts are socially significant and
important. The efforts can have ramifications beyond
healthcare because they involve unprecedented big
data management challenges, the application of
artificial intelligence, and a whole host of social, legal,
and ethical issues that together shape the platforms and
their evolution.

2. Related Literature
Before examining three interlinked tales of genetic
platforms being built by entrepreneurial firms, we
briefly review selected literature on digital platforms
and genetic data banks.

2.1. Digital Platforms
Digital platforms provide a shared set of services and
architecture. The architecture includes technological
modular systems and multiple actors in “multi-sided”
roles [36, 38]. Digital platforms draw on various digital
infrastructures, such as cloud computing and data
analytics. Platforms take on many forms, but here we
focus on platform ecosystems that are “more complex
than either a product family or a multisided market”
[35]. The study of platform ecosystems is important
because these systems can lead to new markets, new
industries, or in the case of science, new knowledge
domains or even specialties. Recent research highlights
how digital platforms can facilitate opportunity
formation, creation, and scaling of entrepreneurial
ventures [8, 18, 42].
Research on digital platforms has taken either a
market or technological perspective [13]. A marketbased perspective starts with a focus on demand and
examines transactions, network effects, and
competition; value is created from matching supply
and demand and pricing. The focus is on competition
between platforms and how economics of scope in
1

(http://www.mcgill.ca/neuro/open-science-0/open-scienceplatform)
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demand can create value. In the market perspective, the
primary role of the platform is as a coordinating device
(IOS and Android platforms are classic examples), and
“the existence of the platform itself is also taken for
granted, exogenous and unchanging” [Gawer, 2014, p.
1241]. Although the possible competition and
collaboration between platforms is recognized, how
that competition shapes the emergence and evolution
of platforms is rarely examined.
A technological perspective takes a supply
perspective and focuses on stable components, such as
modules and functions in technological architectures.
Value is created from reusing components for new
combinations and other forms of co-creation that
increase the growth of offerings. Variety in the
innovation process expands the economies of scope
and generates greater value through the platform. Just
as in the market perspective, the platform is a
coordinating device, but the platform adds value on the
supply side rather than the demand side, promoting
innovations among the technology development
community through various toolkits and application
programming interfaces (APIs). Here again, the IOS
and Android platforms, as well as various maker
platforms such as Shapeways, serve as examples.
Similarly to the market perspective, the
technological perspective provides little insight into the
emergence and evolution of platforms over time. When
the focus is on evolution, it is limited to what happens
with specific components or modules and does not
consider the platform overall.
Neither the market nor the technological
perspective focuses on data except as something
enabled by the APIs or toolkits. In their review paper
on digital platforms, Schreieck et al. [32] state that “no
article explicitly analyzes the role of data as a
boundary resource in platform ecosystems.” The
authors found this lacuna surprising because so many
digital platforms are fueled by data sales.
Admittedly, IS research at large is not devoid of a
data perspective. Some research examines the creation
of business value from large-scale and real-time digital
data streams [25]. However, the focus is on specific
applications and the effect of data streams on specific
firms, rather than on platform ecosystems. Existing
research also examines organizational data supply
chains from the legal and societal perspectives,
including privacy, ownership, and security [21]. Where
data have been the focus, attention has been directed
mainly to open government data or to data governance.

2.2. Genetic Databanks
Data governance was the focus of a study by
Vassilakopoulou, Skorve, and Aanestad [39] on two

different breast cancer genes. The authors chronicle the
emergence of data repositories that involve varying
governance based on public, private, and walled garden
models. The oldest initiative was set up as a public
commons to further the goal of open sharing of all
existing datasets; in this initiative, “registration was
open to all and access to registered users was
unrestricted” [39, p. 7]. However, major labs stopped
contributing, claiming that the quality of the data in the
repository was poor. Meanwhile, the initiative
involving private control has become the world’s
largest service—at least partially because of its use of
multiple methods, advanced infrastructures, and rapid
testing procedures.
The study is important because it can be used to
begin to extrapolate a data perspective to complement
the market and technological perspectives in the digital
platform literature (see Table 1). The platforms are
conceptualized by Vassilakopoulou et al. as databanks,
data commons, and data repositories. Vassilakopoulou
et al. emphasize discovery and advances in scientific
knowledge (e.g., cancer biology) and clinical
knowledge (e.g., better diagnoses of cancer
susceptibility) as the key goals. The value is created
through large-scale and varied data on inheritance and
environmental influences from diverse sources.
TABLE 1. Perspectives on digital platforms
Literature2

Economics

Engineering

Conceptualization

Platforms as
markets

Perspective
Focus
Value
created
through

Demand
Competition
Economics
of scope in
demand

Role

Coordinating
device
among
buyers

Platforms as
technological
architectures
Supply
Innovation
Economics
of scope in
supply and
innovation
Coordinating
device
among
innovators

Empirical
setting

ICT

Manufacturing and ICT

Science
(Genetics)
Platforms as
databanks/
repositories
Knowledge
Discovery
Large-scale data,
varied data sets,
diverse data
sourcing
Coordinating and
quality control
device among
scientists/
clinicians
Personalized
medicine

Although both market and technological
perspectives view platforms as fixed and stable at the
broader platform level, Vassilakopoulou et al. shed
light on the evolution of databanks, including how one
databank stimulates the growth of another and how
databanks compete. Evolution is influenced not just by
the arrival of new actors and their datasets but also by
2

The columns of economics and engineering are adapted
from Gawer (2014).
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sociotechnical design decisions. Decisions that affect
data quality influence the evolution of platforms.
Vassilakopoulou et al.’s study also raises many
other issues, such as intellectual property protection
and legal and ethical concerns that shape the
databanks. Technology is largely in the background,
although the importance of computational techniques
in improving data quality, access, and analysis and in
increasing the benefits to the researchers is
acknowledged. However, fragmentation of the data
persists because of the use of home-grown protocols,
processes, and tools for gathering, storing, and
interpreting genetic data across different research
groups. And data sharing in the research communities
remains selective.
Other research on genetic databanks echoes
concerns over quality of genetic data. Lee [20] points
out that the likelihood of errors in genetic data is
relatively high, “accentuating the need for manual
oversight and verification…. Correcting, updating, and
adding value to existing data records remain critical
challenges.” Data quality issues become even more
complex when health and medical records need to be
merged with genetic records to support clinical
research and, ultimately, clinical practice. For instance,
Gainer and Cagan [12] report that the codes used by
clinicians to designate patient diseases in electronic
medical records often describe possible rather than
definitive diagnoses: They primarily serve
administrative and billing purposes and might not be
accurate enough for research purposes. For example,
the Partners Personalized Medicine initiative required a
sizable data science effort to develop algorithms for
proper disease classifications of medical records,
according to reports.
Below, we explore further the data perspective by
examining three interlinked entrepreneurial initiatives
to advance genetic platforms.

3. Three Tales of Genetic Platforms
The initial focus in our study was on controversies
surrounding genetic databanks and their
commercialization. We followed newspaper articles in
regional and national newspapers. The articles caught
our attention because we were already studying issues
such as data protection and data responsibility.
DeCODE Genetics was acknowledged as a bold
scientific venture that had gone farther than any other
in the commercialization of genetic data, and it had
become a reference point for most discussions of
genetic data commercialization [41]. Following up on
the deCODE story led us to NextCode and
WuxiNextCode. We then searched for the customers of
NextCode and found our third platform example.

Hence, the platforms were not chosen randomly but
instead resulted from an inquiry that followed the
principles of the snowball method. To understand the
entrepreneurial genetic platforms, we relied primarily
on secondary data. The data perspective emerged in
our study when we triangulated our analysis with the
existing literature on digital platforms.

3.1 deCODE: Genetic population database for
Icelanders
This entrepreneurial venture had its start in 1996 in
Iceland when deCODE’s iconic founder, Kari
Stefansson (KS), formerly a neurologist at Harvard
Medical School, received $12 million from seven U.S.
venture capital (VC) firms to build a trio of linkable
databanks that leveraged Iceland’s wealth of medical,
genetic, and genealogical information. The building of
three linked databases was an ambitious and high-risk
vision to generate new scientific discoveries, drugs,
and treatments. Hence, the company’s market entry
point was data.
Initially, deCODE Genetics sought to control
access to the databases it built about Icelandic citizens
using government financial support. deCODE’s
founder justified the exclusivity arrangement by
referencing the expense and commercial risk of genetic
and drug discovery research. deCODE’s arrangement
with the Icelandic government gave the company an
interest in any commercial product resulting from
research using the data [22]. The plans were to sell data
access and research to pharmaceutical companies.
The first task involved turning Iceland’s
genealogical records into searchable form. These
records stretched back 1,000 years and were in the
public domain. In addition to automating genealogical
records, deCODE planned to build the first populationwide genome database in the world by collecting
samples from the entire population. In addition, the
new venture proposed to automate the country’s
medical records.
Hoffman-La Roche Pharmaceuticals provided
initial venture funding and bought the rights to
manufacture any drugs developed by deCODE.
deCODE filed an IPO in 2000 but had mixed results
because of the international controversy that then
surrounded its data plans. KS explained: “Because we
were a commercial entity from the start, we had both
the regulatory entities and the scientific community in
Iceland and abroad concerned” [1].
To build the proposed (but never completed) health
database, KS solicited the help of Iceland’s legislative
entity, the Alþingi. He convinced the entity to pass a
statute authorizing the transfer of personal medical
records (dating back to 1911) from doctors and health
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centers to deCODE. In the process, deCODE would
computerize Iceland’s system of medical records [14].
In 1998, deCODE received from the Icelandic
government a 12-year exclusive license for
construction and commercialization of the database.
The licensing terms included deCODE’s exclusive
access to the database, exclusive rights to generate
findings from it, and the right to sell the findings to
parties chosen by deCODE. According to the statute,
only assumed, rather than informed, consent was
required from citizens. Individuals could opt out by
filling out official forms, but any data already in the
database would not have to be removed [9, 11, 14].
Concerns over ethics, privacy, and security
generated more than 700 news articles on deCODE in
Iceland alone, and many more overseas. The exclusive
privatization agreement authorized by Iceland’s
government authorities led to outcries from researchers
concerned about their future access to the data. A
statement from the chairman of the Icelandic Medical
Association’s ethics council read [33]: “When you put
genealogical information into the data bank and also
genetic data, then the data bank knows more about you
than you know about yourself.” Many members of the
medical community refused to turn over their patients’
health records. The Data Protection Commission was
not convinced of the adequacy of its security. Citizens
as well as concerned parties outside of Iceland were
angered by the lack of informed consent protocols. The
storm culminated in 2000 when a 15-year-old girl filed
a lawsuit because her dead father’s medical records
were to be entered into the database, which she
considered a violation of her privacy. The lawsuit
triggered the Icelandic Supreme Court to rule the
Health Sector Database Act unconstitutional. The court
ruling halted the further construction of a centralized
health database.
When deCODE’s centralized database plan failed,
the firm switched to a distributed approach that
leveraged individual research projects and their data
requirements to collect data samples. deCODE enlisted
the cooperation of the informal owners of the relevant
health data by inviting local physicians to participate as
researchers in its projects. These physicians then
brought their patients to the studies. The company ran
tens of research studies in parallel “under the strictest
standards of informed consent” [41, pp. 94-95]. The
firm reported 95% participation rates in the studies,
and 90% of participants signed the broader consent
form. Such high rates of participation were unheard of
around the world, including in the United States. By
2002, statements were made suggesting that, to some
extent, “a [health] database now exists inside
deCODE” [41]. These developments also were aided
and supported by those in Iceland who donated their

blood samples. Encouragement to participate was seen
by some as patriotic in building a biological
powerhouse in the North Atlantic, while others viewed
the high levels of participation as indicative of
“coercion” because many Icelandic citizens had
heavily invested in deCODE shares [4].
During the mid-2000s, the company sought to
become a full-fledged biotech company. Continuing to
build its downstream capabilities, deCODE partnered
with both Merck and Bayer. The company also
invested heavily in its technological capabilities. It
partnered with IBM and strengthened its computing
and data mining technologies.
In the late 2000s, however, investors in deCODE
grew impatient. The firm filed for bankruptcy in 2009,
selling data access and technological assets to another
private entity, while much of the company’s
management team remained intact. The startup focused
on selling direct-to-consumer genetic testing kits to
accelerate the collection of data samples, but it
encountered significant pushback from the medical
community and regulators. In 2010, deCODE
downsized from 750 people to 125 people. All
downstream activities were sold off. The company
focused on basic scientific research.
In 2012, Amgen acquired deCODE. With Amgen
came independence, stability, and the financial
resources needed to focus on fundamental research that
would leverage access to the population-based data of
about 120,000 Icelanders. According to the editor of
Nature Genetics, some 5% of the journal’s cumulative
articles since 2000 have been authored by deCODE
researchers. deCODE itself claims to have published
more than 400 articles across various outlets [1].
In 2013, data and research activities were separated
from proprietary technologies, and the latter were
incorporated into a venture called NextCODE. The
new platform venture was legally and commercially
separate from the access to data. The data were owned
by the Icelandic government and had to remain in
Iceland.

3.2. WuXiNextCODE: Global Platform of
Open Data with Proprietary Infrastructures
In 2015 NextCODE merged with a division of
WuXi,3 a Chinese contract research company, to form
WuXiNextCODE. WuXi provided access both to large
farms of sequencing machines and to the Chinese
market.
In the two years since the merger, WuXiNextCODE
has built the leading large-scale, integrated, global
genetics platform, with strong cloud-based computing,
3

WuXi is used here to correspond to WuXiPharma and
WuXiApptech.
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deep learning, and elastic relational database
infrastructures. The platform is positioned as a bridge
between research and clinical care, and the goal is to
expand the overlap between the two. To turn genetic
data into actionable knowledge for a person’s treatment
plans can require linking millions of different
individuals’ genomes. Genome sequencing and
research feed directly into clinical care, and clinical
care feeds comprehensive patient health information
back into research.
WuXiNextCODE’s proprietary technology includes
a relational database architecture and an artificial
intelligence engine. It is based on streaming data and is
unrivaled in its efficiency in the storage and processing
of genomic joins. The technology is versatile in
accessing data in varied formats, including from web
pages. The platform offers a workbench and interactive
query tools for researchers and clinicians.
Although the platform’s infrastructure technologies
are proprietary, the platform promotes global sharing
through open data access to any registered user. The
platform manages the largest genome cohort database
in the world. Hence, WuXiNextCODE has already
accomplished what its rivals, including the FDA and
the National Institute of Standards and Technology,
have been trying to achieve for years.
The WuXiNextCODE platform has enabled new
research collaborations and expedited clinical trials
across projects and countries. For example, the
platform collaborates with Huawei and its “China
precision medicine cloud.”4 The platform is now in use
in population genomics projects, precision medicine
applications, and clinical diagnosis and wellness in
China, England, Ireland, the United States, Qatar, and
Singapore. In the United States, the platform is in use
at Boston’s Children’s Hospital and Cincinnati
Children’s Hospital. In its partnership with Shanghai
Children’s Hospital, the WuXiNextCODE platform
sequences some two million genomes annually. The
company offers several products in Chinese markets,
including a whole-genome wellness service for
Chinese consumers. The company currently is going
through an IPO filing in China.

3.3. START: Open source genetic research
database with voluntary resources
In 2007, Anthony Tolcher left the UT Health
Science Center in San Antonio to start up South Texas
Accelerated Research Therapeutics (START) with two
other colleagues. Today, START is one of the largest
oncology treatment practices in the San Antonio area
and a leading independent (i.e., unaffiliated with an

academic medical center) cancer research and drug
development center. In fact, START (with centers also
in the upper midwest, Europe, and Asia) has arguably
become the world leader in Phase I clinical trials for
oncology—an area of activity long dominated by
academic medical centers.
As an unaffiliated cancer center, START had access
to tumor samples only from its own patients. Tissue
samples in tumor banks are held by academic medical
centers and are available only to researchers at those
centers. (The U.S. National Cancer Institute operates
open-access tissue banks, but these repositories lack
comprehensive healthcare data.)
To increase its access to tumor samples for clinical
research, Tolcher and his colleagues at START
announced in 2010 the establishment of a San Antonio
cancer tumor bank, funded by private donors. Unlike
affiliated tumor banks, the START’s tumor bank was
to be open access—meaning that cancer researchers
anywhere in the world could gain access to START’s
“consented” tissue samples (i.e., samples from patients
who had given appropriate written consent). The open
access nature of the START tumor bank was intended
to encourage cancer researchers around the world to
contribute their patients’ consented tissue samples, thus
accelerating research.
Developing the tumor bank required substantial
investment. Communicating the idea to the local
oncology community took time. In addition, START
had to develop new procedures for obtaining patient
consent, obtaining associated medical records data,
collecting and transporting samples to the bank, and
releasing samples for preclinical research. All these
efforts were successful. Since 2010, START’s tumor
bank has become the world’s largest repository of
samples of a certain rare cancer; it receives samples
weekly from around the world. In addition, START
researchers have published widely in the cancer
research literature and have received numerous
prestigious awards.
The success of START’s tumor bank positioned it
well for its next major donor-funded initiative in 2012.
Known as the San Antonio 1000 Cancer Genome
Project (SA1KCGP), it is an open access database of
genomic data from 1,000 consenting patients. After an
early partnership with Beijing Genomics, Inc. (BGI),
START signed on with WuXiNextCODE for low-cost,
high-volume genetic sequencing, informatics support,
and cloud data storage. In early 2017, START was
more than halfway to its goals in terms of the number
of samples collected and sequenced and the funds
raised for genetic sequencing and analysis.

4
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High-quality medical records data, when linked
with genetic samples and data, offer significant
advantages for drug discovery—and high-quality
electronic health records (EHR) data are scarce. First,
the coding of diseases in clinical EHR systems
typically is designed for insurance reimbursement
purposes and is not of sufficient quality for research
needs. Second, the many commercially available EHR
systems do not easily connect with one another. To
illustrate, Partners Healthcare in Boston has spent
billions to implement common EHR systems across its
hospitals to support its clinical practice and research on
personalized medicine. Even so, it also has had to
make considerable investments in bioinformatics
analysis to ensure adequate diagnostic coding. NIH
genetic data, although open to researchers around the
world, offer only limited medical/health/phenotypic
data. Thus, if START is able to offer tumor samples,
genetic data, and high-quality clinical data, it would
indeed have a valuable resource.
To get there, START faced the challenge that nonSTART contributors (e.g., local health care providers
whose patients’ consented samples are sent to
START’s tumor bank for research) used many
different and incompatible EHR systems. To overcome
this challenge, START developed a proprietary
software tool, called Clinical Synchrony (trademarked
in 2013) for retrieving and standardizing clinical data,
including both treatment and survival data. Clinical
Synchrony extracts relevant data from providers’
systems and loads it into vendor Medidata’s Rave (a
cloud-based clinical data management system) in a
common format, so that it can be searched and
analyzed.
The next challenge is to provide researchers with a
“data portal” that allows them to easily search and
analyze linked genomic and clinical data. START’s
genomic data currently are curated on the
WuXiNextCODE platform; START’s clinical data are
stored in Medidata’s Clinical Cloud. Researchers need
an easy way to access the two systems in tandem. Both
WuXiNextCODE and Medidata have expressed
interest in developing START’s data portal.
To date, START has no paid staff dedicated to its
open source genetic data program. START researchers
are participating in the effort as a collateral assignment.
START’s scientific contributions are considerable.
In 2016 alone, its researchers presented 31 papers and
abstracts at a major cancer conference (American
Society of Clinical Oncology, 2016). Although START
is not affiliated with any university medical school, it
sponsors resident visiting scientists.
Table 2 compares the three platforms.

Table 2. Comparison of the three platforms
Company/
Platform
Key
Actors

Goals
Value
proposition

Type
of data

Tensions

deCODE

WuXiNextCODE

START’s SA1kCGP

Founder,
HoffmanLaRoche,
venture
capitalists
Scientific
research
Monetize the
data through
discovery of
new drugs and
treatments
Genetic,
genealogical,
and medical
data on
Icelandic
citizens
Data
privacy/security
and data access
by independent
researchers

deCODE, Amgen
Ventures, WuXi
executives

START, donors,
WuXiNextCODE,
other technology
partners

Infrastructure for
precision medicine
Monetize the
platform

Oncology clinical
trials
Create a tissue bank
and data resource
to support clinical
research

Genetic, clinical,
behavioral and
other data brought
into the platform by
platform customers

Genetic and clinical
data on rare
cancers contributed
by START and
regional clinicians

Scaling and quality
of inferences for
improved research
and clinical care

Open access, data
quality, voluntary
contributions

4. Discussion
The tales of deCODE, WuXiNextCODE, and
START’s SA1kCGP show how genetic platforms
contribute to “changing models of biomedical
research” [7] and clinical care. The platforms facilitate
the access to large data sets and the analysis of genetic
data combined with detailed phenotypical data from
medical records and family history. Increasingly, these
platforms would be expected to include behavioral
monitoring data from daily activities (e.g., fitness and
nutrition data). The entrepreneurial initiatives operate
at the edges of traditional health care systems. The
platform owners and key architects are neither large
university research hospitals nor governments. The
initiatives have exhibited considerable flexibility and
adaptability to leverage technologies and combine
varied data or samples with other datasets. To varying
extents, the initiatives also have been able to
commercialize their research results in the form of
products and therapies in the market. But the initiatives
continue to face many concerns and to experience
many tensions.
The three genetic platforms have adopted different
governance models. deCODE tightly controlled data
access and commercialization rights. Its investments
were privately funded. In contrast, START’s cancer
genome project has offered open access to data to
encourage voluntary contributions. The investments
were funded by financial donations and donations of
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time and energy. In the case of the WuXiNextCODE
platform, a mixed open–closed data model is followed
in which researchers maintain and curate the data they
provide but gain access to large volumes of data about
human genetic variants and phenotypes provided
through the platform. The platform allows researchers
to circumvent the nonstandard tools, technical
incompatibilities, and data conversions that have
previously hampered genetic databanks.
The differences in the governance models and
strategies deployed in these platforms were influenced
by differing goals and internal and external constraints.
deCODE pursued bold scientific discoveries that
required improved access to genetic and health data.
The firm realized early on that the phenotypic data
from medical records and family history were critical
to rendering genetic data useful for research. The firm
sought to build three linkable databases (i.e.,
genealogy, health, and genetic) covering the entire
population of Iceland. Two of the databases were
ultimately built, but the health database was scuttled in
the wake of international controversies. However, a
change in strategy helped deCODE to reach its goal.
deCODE began working directly with physicians to
gain access to patients for participation in research
studies. As Winickoff [41] reported, “…[deCODE] had
found a way to amass large amounts of health
information and samples by traditional methods—
methods that did not require building the [centralized
health system data] architecture for Iceland.”
START required high-quality data to carry out its
main business of clinical trials for treatments. Its lack
of affiliation with medical schools and government
agencies created a scarcity of data, which the company
resolved by embarking on its own platform initiative. It
also relied heavily on existing networks with its cancer
clinics and broadened these networks using an open
access approach. Unencumbered by the institutional
barriers associated with universities and government
agencies, START has been able to move fast. Also, its
local practitioner networks provided access to samples
that represent a spectrum of disease states; thus,
START data have not been limited to the most
advanced cases of disease that characterize many
university repositories. (The most difficult cases often
are referred to university hospitals.) START built a
technical architecture and open access governance
model that encouraged contributions of tumor samples
and genetic data. And START’s investment in the
Clinical Synchrony tool allowed clinical medical
record data to be merged into the database. Hence, the
different goals and starting points resulted in different
governance options. These governance options, in turn,
influenced the nature of the regulations and
controversies that surrounded the platforms.

The evolving regulations and controversies shaped
the overall evolution of the platforms. Many
governments around the world restricted (or even
prohibited) exclusive commercial access to data
gathered by public national health programs; the
Icelandic government did so as well, although not
initially. Independent researchers feared losing access
to research data if deCODE retained exclusive access
rights. The medical community mounted opposition to
deCODE’s plans, including its attempts to enter the
direct-to-consumer genetic testing market. The
reliability of the tests, the value of the tests, and the
citizens’ ability to understand the long-term
ramifications of such tests were particularly
questioned. Concerns about data privacy and the
security of individuals’ health data culminated in a
major change from a centralized data initiative to a
much more distributed undertaking.
After Amgen acquired deCODE, the digital
platform was separated from the access to data. The
platform provided a new pathway to
commercialization. The technology was much less
contested and regulated, compared to the data.
deCODE developed a myriad of new technologies
involving major patented inventions for the platform.
The large scale of its database and the
multidimensionality of the genetic and phenotype data
rendered traditional data formats and database
structures inadequate. deCODE partnered with vendors
to develop its AI capabilities for the platform.
The initiatives also highlight how issues related to
data quality shaped the evolution of the platforms.
Although deCODE and START used different
governance models in their platforms, each exhibited
tight controls in data gathering and records
management to reduce the data quality problems
known to threaten both genomic data and phenotypic
data. Such challenges have implications not only for
the technical design of genetic databanks, but also for
the rules governing data contributions and
modifications.
The pursuit of high-quality data in genetic
platforms created optimism that entrepreneurial
ventures might promote data sharing for research and
clinical care. The success of emerging approaches to
clinical and translational research depends significantly
on improved platforms of genetic and health data,
which in turn require greater collaboration and data
sharing among researchers and clinicians. Still
researchers are reluctant to share the data they have
collected and analyzed [15]. For example, researchers
might comply with norms and rules for rapid
publication of genetic sequence data [20] but then
exclude the phenotypic data that would make genetic
data much more useful for research. Even when
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researchers are motivated to share their data, they are
constrained by the need to protect patient
confidentiality and to follow data security provisions.
These concerns suggest the need for access controls to
ensure that only appropriate uses of databank resources
are allowed. Meanwhile, even modest access
restrictions can seriously impede the “open science”
goals of genetic databanks and platforms [6].
Designing governance arrangements that promote
contributions, ensure data quality, and encourage
innovative and responsible data use is a difficult
balancing act, and the need for such a design approach
represents promising opportunities for future research.
Although platforms certainly need to facilitate data
sharing, research also needs to examine how the
platforms shape research collaborations and the
research questions pursued in such collaborations. How
does the composition of research teams shape the
platforms? Both deCODE and START show
remarkable levels of international collaboration, as
well as significant research productivity.
Another avenue of future research would explore
how the platforms collaborate, compete, and trigger the
formation of new platforms. Generativity needs to be
examined at the platform level. START partnered with
WuXiNextCODE for genome sequencing and
infrastructure services (e.g., cloud storage services),
but START is also pursuing its own open platform,
including an access portal. How will these initiatives
complete or collaborate with public large-scale
national and global data-sharing efforts [17, 40]?
We close by returning to the digital platform
literature. Although the platform literature has shed
much light on the market and technological
perspectives, the data-centric perspective is lacking.
The room for further developing this perspective is
abundant. For example, future studies need to examine
meaning-making systems for the data; such systems
not only can circumscribe the data but also control how
such platforms facilitate new meanings. That is,
algorithms and other tools intended to convert data into
actionable knowledge become bounded by these
semantic meaning-making knowledge structures [37].
Hence, although the platforms we have discussed here
offer promising early steps, much research is needed to
understand strategies and governance arrangements for
digital platforms to promote scientific discoveries and
treatments while maintaining the necessary security
and privacy.
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